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How do the poorest 40 percent fare under market-oriented
reform? Lower  income  groups  suffer  when real wages  fall and
unemployment increases.  Then their situation improves as
medium-term  growth takes off and conditions  improve in the
labor market.  A sort of Kuznets  relation  can be traced  between
reform and distribution.
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After relatively stable income distribution in the  proached full capacity, when wages rose and
1960s, and a redistribution toward lew-income  unemployment dropped to a historic low in the
groups under Allende, income shares duclined  early 1990s, did income distribution for t ie poor
for the 40 percent of the population (low- and  improve.  If growth continues and investment
lower-middle income groups) under Pinochet.  grows even faster, as in the past two years, the
The top 20 percent benefited most from the  labor market will remain tighter than in any
income shift away from low-income groups.  period in the past 30 years and distribution may
Under Aylwin, the income share of the bottom  improve more significantly.
40 percent retumed to previous levels, bVut  taie
share of the top 20 percent remained above its  Is a liberalized economy compatible with
pre-1973 historical average.  social equity?  Marcel and Solimano show that
initially income distribudon deteriorated under
Marcel and Solimano show that in the first  reform, chiefly because of macroeconomic crises
years of market-oriented reform income for the  and subsequent high unemployment and de-
poor deteriorated, chiefly because of persistent  pressed real wages.  However, it is not clear that
high unemployment and a squeeze on the real  trade liberalization and deregulation are socially
minimum wage and other wage categories.  regressive, though the market outcomes that
dominate in a liberalized economy may generate
The share of the middle class (the third and  a failure in the labor market that social policy
fourth quintiles) in national income declined by  should correct.
an average 3 percentage points during 1974-89
- because of cutbacks in public sector employ-  There is more potential for improving the
ment and steadily declining public sector wages.  quality of social services today than in the past,
but targeting of social services should be de-
Recession with high unemployment espe-  signed to prevent the "poveriy trap."  Targeting
cially hurts the poor, and growth does not  and social policies should be designed to encour-
equalize conditions until it strengthens labor  age personal efforts to escape poverty and to
markets.  Only when Chile's economy ap-  avoid alienating middle-income groups.
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The recent economic history of Chile of the last three
decacdes  is perhaps one of the most fascinating  (albeit dramatic)
cases of radical changes in development strategies and political
regimes in Latin America. Central to those policy shifts lies the
role attached to income distribution by the different actors that
led political and  economic changes in Chile during that period. The
explicit quest for redistribution started in the mid sixties, when
a  centrist  government  led by President  Eduardo  Frei took power
under the banner of a "revolution in freedom" that would introduce
gradual changes in the patterns of wealth and income distribution
in Chile, through  agrarian reform  and expanded social services,
within the framework of a developmentalist economic strategy.  In
1970, a  democratically-elected Marxist President, Salvador  Allende,
was put in office under the promise of a radical rece ;ribution of
wealth  and  income  in favor  of the urban  working  class  and the
peasantry.  Redistributing income and wealth and establishing the
foundations  for Chilean-tailored  socialism  ("the Chilean Way to
Socialism")  were  the  top  priorities  of  the  Popular  Unity
government. After an initial bonanza followed by a couple of years
of  economic  destabilization  and  acute  political  conflict,  the
military  took  power,  deposed  Allende  and  established  an
authoritarian regime. The new regime, once again, sought to reshape
the economic landscape of Chile, this time along free market lines.
Hyperinflation  and  large  macroeconomic  imbalances  were  to  be
tackled  first,  as a precondition for  success in the program  of
trade  liberalization, privatization, financial sector reform and2
labor demobilization. Income distribution was to be less important
than adjustment and liberalization.
After  the  military  regime,  a  civilian  governr,,ent  led  by
President Aylwin took office in early 1990. The economic program of
the  new administration preserved most  of the structural  reforms
adopted in tha Pinochet 'egime.  A more progressive distributive
twist was in order though, to redress a forgotten dimension of the
liberalization program initiated by the military regime. This was
to  be  achieved  by  a  significant  increase  in  social  siending,
supported by sustained GDP growth &nd changes in labor legislation
and in the tax system.
The experience of Chile is very interesting for addressing a
broad  set  of  questions  related  to  economi  c  reform,  income
distribution and public policies. Does macroeconomic adjustmenit  and
its sequels in  the labor market --  like protracted unemployment and
decline in real wages --  affect the distributive position of low
inco1.te  groups?  What  is  the  impact  of  inflation  on  income
distribution? Is economic growth inequalizing or equalizing? Is a
more  lib_.al policy  regime  compatible  with  social  equity? Does
inequality  initially worsen  and then  improve in the process  of
economic reform?  What is the scope for social policy through the
public  provision  of education, health, housing and transfers  to
correct distributional outco3mes  of pure market processes?
The paper contains three sections besides the introduction.
Section 2, gives an overview of the different economic policies
adopted in the period 1960-92 and the associated distributive and3
macroeconomic  outcomes, discussing  the nature and  impact of the
social policies implexniented  in that period.
In section 3, a simple econometric model of determination of
personal  income  distribution  in Chile  is estimated  using  time
series information on income  shares by qu ntil for tle period 1960-
91.1  The analysis seeks to gauge the relative importance of labor
market  variables  (unemploymant  and  real  minimum  wages),
macroeconomic  factors  (GDP growth,  inflation,  rate  of  capacity
utilization) and structural variables  (education, type of policy
regime).  The  model  is  estimated  under  a  set  of  alternative
closures. A decomposition exercise is carried out to evaluate the
rejative  contribution  of  the  explanatory  variablss  to  explain
actual changes in the share of the bottom 40 percent and the top 20
percent income  groups for  relevant sub-periods.  The paper closes in
section 4 with final remarks and conclusions.
2. INCOME DISTRIBUTION. STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND soCIAL
POLICIES: AN OVERVIEW.
Income  distribution in Chile is  very unequal. While the bottom
40 percent of the population receives around 10  percent of national
income, the top 20 percent receives 60 percent. The situation is
even more dramatic  if we consider that the income  share of the
bottom 20 percent of the population is  around 4 percent.  The ratio
of  the  income  shares  of the  top  and  bottom  20 percent  of the
I  The focus here is  on patterns of distribution rather than
on poverty.  An extensive  analysis  of the  relationship  between
development  and Poverty is carried out in the World  Development
Report, 1990.4
population  has  fluctuated  between  18 and  23  in the  last  three
decades  in Chile 2. This  pattern  of  income  distribution  is more
unequai than the one in East Asia and the OECD.  Ilowever,  in Latin
America,  income distribution  is more unequal  --  than in Chile  --  in
countries  like Brazil, Peru and others, though  in Argentina  and
Uruguay income distribution is less unequal than in Chile 3.
This  section  looks  at  changes  in  the  patterns  of  income
distribution  in Chile  in the last three decades with particular
interest in the chenges taking place after 1974 when a new model of
market oriented reform started to be implemented 4.
Table  1  provides  information  on  the  evolutioin of  income
distribution  (shares in national  income by quintils)  during  the
last five governments  in Chile,  from 1959 to  1992. The  figu-es
correspond to the shares of income recipients per capita from an
homogenous sample of around 3,000 households in the Creat Santiago,
as compiled  by University  of  Chile  (for a  discussion  of  other
sources of information, for selected years on income distribution
in Chile, see annex). The basic picture emerging from table 1 is
that of a relatively stable income share of the bottom 40 percent
2  Survey  data  may  tend  to under-estimate  the  degree  of
income inequality in the country for two reasons.  On the one hand,
non-wage  incomes  (in  particular  capital  incomes,  rents  and
interests  earnings)  tend  to  be  underreported  by  surveys
respondents.  On the other hand, the survey covers the metropolitan
area  of  Santiago and  not rural  areas where  income  distribution
tends to be more skewed.
3  See Larrain and Vergara  (1992) and Cardoso and Helwege
(1992).
4  Studies  on  income  distribution  and  its  relation  to
economic  policies  in Chile  in that period  include, Pollack and
Uthoff  (1986), Rodriguez  (1985), Torche  (1987), Oyarzo  (1990),
Meller  (1991), Raczynski and Romaguera  (1992), Solimano  (1992).Table  1: Income  Distribution  in  Chile,  1959-1992
(Income  Shares  per  Quintile,  percent)
_ 
lot  2nd  Bottom  3rd  4th  Middle  5th  Ratio
Quintile  Quintile  40%  Quintile  Quietile  40%  Quintile  5th Quintile
(lat L 2nd Quin.)  (3rd & 4th guin.%  over
l  ________________  ._____________  .________  _________________  lot  Q  uintil  e
Aleo9andri  Govt.  3.2  7.5  10.7  1l.P  20.1  j2.0  57.9  18.1
1959-64  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Frei Govt.  3.2  7.1  10.3  11.4  19.7  31.1  58.6  19.5
1965-  70  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  ___  _  __  _
Allende Govt.  3.1  7.5  10.6  12.5  21.5  34.0  55.4  17.9
1971-73  __
Pinochet  Regime  2.7  6.4  9.1  10.6  lb.3  28.9  62.0  23.G
1974-89  _  _  . _
Aylwin Govt.  3.4  6.7  10.1  10.5  17.9  28.4  61.5  18.1
1990-92  ____
Source;  Survey  of Household  Incomes. Univeraidad  de Chile.6
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of the population during the 1960s udth some increase during  :he
Allende Government.  During the Pinochet Regime (1974-89),  however,
the income share cf the bottom 40 percent declined, on average, by
1.5 percentage points vis a  vis the 1960-73  period. This represents
a drop of  nearly 14 percent in the income share of that group. In
the Avlwirn  Governme,at  there  is a rever-al  in that trend  as the
share of the bottom 40 parcent during its first two years in cff-ce
increased by 1 percentage p,int compared to the Pinochet regime.
The story for the top 20 percent is the opposite. Its income
share  increased  modestly  in the  sixties,  declined  by  nearly  3
percentaae  points  under Allende and incre sed by 4.7 percentage
points during the Pinochet Regime, during the period 1960-73.  In
the Aylwin Administration, the share of  the top 20 percent declined
by 0.5 percent.
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  a  major  part  of  the
redistribution of in1come  during the Pinochet period took place from
the "middle class" (third  and fourth  quintils), that declined their
incomae  share by more than 3  percentage points (respect  to 1960-73),
to the top 20 percent. During  the Aylwin  Government  there  is a
decline  in the  share  of the  middle  40 perc,.nt  and  the  top  20
percent  by  0.5  percentage  points  that  is redistributed  to  the
bottom 40 percent.
Economic  policies  and  politics  in Chile  experienced  major
swings  in the  last three decades.  The Alessandri  Government of
1958-64 was a conservative administration that focused most of its
energies  to  the  task  of  abating  inflation  and  consolidating8
macroeconomic stability. Economic liberalizatic.c  was nor.  a major
part of the economic agenda ot the Alessandc.i  Governi-4.nt  at that
time 5. The Frei Administratioi-  starting in early 1965, comr:ised
a program of economic modernization with moderate redistribution.
That program included the implementation of an agrarian reform, the
auasi-nationalization  of  foreign-owned  copDer  mining,  the  main
source  of  foreign exchange  at  the  time,  besides  an  aggressive
program  of  expansion  of  education,  public  health  and  physical
infrastructure. Labor union affiliation expanded significantly. In
macroeconomic  terms,  tha  Frei  Administration  was  relatively
orthodox, giving high priority to assuring moderate inU'ation and
controlling potential fiscal  and balance of  payments disequllibria.
The Allende Government 6 was an attempt--strongly influenced by
the rise of the political left in Chile (and  elsewhere) in the late
1960s  --  of radical  redistributiorn  of  income towards  the  urban
woing  class  and  the peasantr':.  The  economic  program  of the
Allende  Government,  with  s..rong Marxian  roots,  included  the
nationalization of most medium- to large-scale industrial firms,
the banking system, the imiain  natural resources, and an acceleration
of the agrarian reform. The stated goal was to lay the foundations
for transforming the Chilean economy into a socialist one. In the
macroeconomic  front, very expansiva monetary and fiscal policies
5  A very complete discussion of the economic policies of
the  Alessandri  and  Frei  administrations  is  in  Ffrench-Davies
(1972).
6  An  insider view  of that  period  is provi.ded  by  Bitar
(1979). See also Larrain and Meller  (1991).9
were pursued along with generous increases in minimum and public
sector wages supported by price controls and tight foreign exchange
rationing.  This  expansionary  stance  also  extended  to  social
spending as we will see below.
A military coup ousted the Government of President Allende in
september of  1973. The economic policies of the military regime
(amply  documented elsewhere) 7,  included a vast program of economic
liberalization  and reform  to be carried-out  in an authoritarian
context.  The  liberalization  program  included  trade  opening,  a
rationalization of the public sector, including the privatization
of most state-owned enterprises, and financial sector and social
security  reforms.  Labor  unions  were  demobilized  and  repressed
initially,  and  then  allowed  to  operate  under  a  new  labor
legislation  that  precluded  nation-wide  and  sectoral  level
negotiation  over  wages  ani  other  working  conditions.  In  the
macroeconomic  front,  the  main  objectives  were  to  reduce  and
stabilize  inflation,  (very high  after  Allende,  see  table  2),
correct a large fiscal deficit and assure a sustainable balance of
payments position.  At the political level, left-wing parties were
banned for most of the period and centrist political parties were
considerably  restricted  in  their  activities.  The  Parliament
remained closed for 16 years.
Finally the:r  Aylwin Administration, elected in the first open
Presidential election since 1970, preserved many of the structural
7  See Edwards and Edwards (1985), Fontaine (1989), Meller
(1990), Corbo  (1993),  Corbo and Solimano (1991).10
reforms implemented  during the previous administration that yielded
high  growth  in the  late 1980s.  To make  the  Chilean model  more
equitable, changes in  the tax system  were introduced. Corporate and
personal income taxes were raised, as well as the value added tax,
in order  to secure  financing  for a  program of  increased social
expenditure in low-income families. In addition, the minimum wage
was increased and changes in labor legislation were passed in the
parliament  in  order  to  redress  the  existing  imbalance  in  the
relative bargaining  power between labor and capital, inherited from
the military regime.  Moderate redistribution was framed in macro
policies  of  fiscal  and monetary  restraint  in order  to maintain
macroeconomic stability.
Table 2  summarizes the  main economic indicators of  performance
in  the period 1960-92, for  the five presidential periods. The 1960s
were  a  period  of moderate  growth  --  about  4 percent  per  year  --
with an annual inflation rate of 26 percent per year.  Unemployment
hovered around 5-6 percent and real wages increased steadily. The
Allende years, in the early 1970s, were of great dislocation at the
macroeconomic level as fiscal  deficits exploded (reaching  nearly 25
percent  of  GDP  in  1973)  and  inflation  climbed  to  three  digit
levels. The redistributive impulse of the Unidad Popular GovernmentTable  2:  Chile  - Main  Economic  and Social Indicators,  1960-1992
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (1)  (9)
GDP  Rate  of  Pubhc  Unemploymcni  Average  Minimum  Public Seator  Social  ptice
Growth  Inflation  Sector  Rate  Real  Real  Real Wage  Expcndiurc  of
(annual  average, %)  (Dec-Dec, %)  Deficit  (% of labor  Wage  Wage  (1970= 100)  (% of GDP)  Copper
_____________  (%  of GDP)  force)  (1970= 100)  (1970=100)  (USSlPound)
Alssandri  Govt.  3.9  26.6  4.7'  5.'  62.2?  116.e  - 32.4'
1959-64
Fmi Govt.  4.1  26-3  2.1  5.9  84.2  101.8  81.4  61.0
1965-70  ___  ___
A11ende  Govt.  0.7  285.7  16-1  4.8  90.0  134 0  87.9  - 59.6
Pinoch|1 Regim  3.4  79.9  0.5  17.1  81.4  8330  753  4.5  78.7
1974-891j
Aylwin Govt.  5.9  19.6  -0.3  6.5  94.7  83.0  783w  3.6  1102
1990-92  . 1
Sources  (1) (8) Indicadorcs  Economicos  y Socialea.  Banco Central de Chile.
(2) Central Bank, Cortazar-Marahall  (1980) and Yaiez (1971-72).
(3) Corbo (1993).
(4) Universidad  de Chile, Encuesa de Ocupaei6n y Desocupacion  Gran - Santiago
Dec-Dec. It includes  emergency  employment  programs.
(5) (6) Jadresic (1990).
(7)  Cabezas (1989) and Direccion de Presupuestos, Minislerio de liacienda,  Chile.
No c":  b/ 1960-64
bl 1990-9112
was  reflected in massive  increases in minimum and public  sector
wages. The acceleratlon of inflation in 1972 and 1973 eroded part
of the initial increase in wages, though they still increased, on
average, in real terms during the 1971-73  period.  The minimum wage
hike along with the decline in unemployment, is likely to account
for much  of the increase  in the  income share  of the  bottom  40
percent. The Pinochet period  led, in a stop and go fashion, to a
resumption  of output  growth, a  slow decline  in inflation  and a
rapid elimination of fiscal deficits. However, on aver  growth
performance for the whole period does not look very imp  ive. Of
course, averages conceal considerable intra-period variat 'r in  the
data. Growth performance was very strong in 1976-81  and 1°87-89,
though the economy experienced two big recessions in 1975  and 1982-
83.  Inflation  ran  at  an  annual  average  rate  of  248.7  percent
between 1974-78,  and declined slowly to an average annual rate of
23.6 percent per year between 1978  and 1989.
Labor market performance was bleak during most of the period,
an important factor  behind the deterioration of income distribution
for low-income groups, detected during  the Pinochet Regime  (see
next  section).  On  average,  for  Metropolitan  Santiago,  the
effective 8 unemployment  rate  was  17.1  percent  during  1974-89,
tripling  the  average  rate  of the  period  1960-73.  In  addition,
average real wages during 1974-89  were close to the level of the
early 1960s  and near 9 percentage points below that of the Allende
8  These figures include emergency employment programs that
paid less than the national minimum wage  (see Annex).13
period. The minimum wage declined by 26 percent in real terms in
1974-89  with respect to the period 1960-73 and in almost 40 percent
with respect to the Allende years.  The fall in the income share of
the middle-class  (3rd and 4th quintils) can  be associated  to a
decline in salaries in the public sector (the single  most important
employer of middle-income groups).  In fact, on average the index
of real wages  in the public  sector  declined near  13 percentage
points  in  1974-89 compared  to  the  average under  Allende  and  6
points compared to the level under Frei.  Moreover, after 1974-75
the real price of goods and services intensive in the consumption
basket of the middle-class went up. In fact, before the military
government, public education from primary school to universities,
public health and housing were provided free of charge, or highly
subsidized to the middle-class. With the fiscal reform of the mid-
seventies,  most  of  these  subsidies  were  either  eliminated  or
reduced for middle-income groups. Interestingly, a  large part of
the resources taken away from the 3rd and 4th quintil went, in the
end, to the top 20 percent.
The first three years of the Aylwin Administration continued
and  consolidated  the  strong  performance  of  the  Chilean  economy
registered  in  the  second  half  of  the  1980s,  generating  an
impressive investment and growth momentum since 1991.  Inflation
declined (now  in the annual range of 10-13 percent) in  a context of
fiscal balance and a very strong balance of payments position. In
the labor market, unemployment declined to historical  lows  (the
unemployment  rate  was  4.4 percent  in  1992).  In  1990-1992,  the14
average real wage was 7.2 percentage higher than its level in 1980-
89 (the average real wage of 1992 was 10.4 percent higher than in
1980-89). In turn, the real minimum wage in 1990-92, is on average
at the same level to that of the period 1974-89; however, the real
minimum wage is around 5 percentage points higher in 1990-92 with
respect to the period 1980-89. In turn, in 1992, the real minimum
wage is near 15 percentage points higher than the average of 1980-
89.  Clearlv,  the combination  of  lower unemployment  and higher
minimum and average real wages in  the period 1990-1992 with respect
to the 1960s coincides with the improvement of near 1.0 percentage
points in the income share of the bottom 40 percent.
SOCIAL POLICIES
Historically, the origin of social policies  in Chile can be
traced to the early 1920s when basic legislation concerning primary
education, public health, labor regulations and social sezurity was
enacted 9. The early development of the trade unions and the rapid
urbanization of the country put social pressure upon the state for
an  expansion  of  social  services.  The  financing  of  the  newly
created  social  services  and the expansion of public employment came
mainly  from  nitrate  and  copper  industries  which  provided  an
important source of  revenues to the gc;ernment.
1960-73:"Extensive" Social Policies and Redistributive Policies
The  government  of  Frei  (and  Allende  later)  expanded
See Arellano  (1985).15
considerably social expenditure in education, health and housing as
part of their redistributive objectives.
The  "welfare  state"  extended  to  satisfy  the  demands  of
traditionally  well-organized  groups  of  white  and  blue-collar
workers.  Entitlement  grew  substantially  in several  areas  like
housing, higher education and health insurance. On the other hand,
emerging groups of the rural and urban poor were incorporated to be
recipients of these policies.
In  spite  that  the  excessive  benefits  were  extending  well
beyond the most vulnerable groups of the population into the middle
and  even  higher  income  groups,  efforts  at  targeting  of  social
expenditure were very limited during this period.  The Governments
were  reluctant  to  engage  in  any  major  confrontation  with  thep
middle- class.  Betweeni  1961 and 1970, social expenditure nearly
doubled in real terms demanding a growing share of GDP and of  total
government expenditure to that end. Education and social security
were the most important items as they accounted for near two-t4:irds
of social spending in that period  (see figure 2). Nearly half the
growth in these sectors was due to an increase in school enrolirent
and the number of pensioners which grew at an annual rate of '.;
percent and 10.3 percent durinq the period.  Therefore, this was a
phase of extensive development of social services.
This  trend  of  the  1960s  was  accentuated  by  the  Allende
Governmenit  but  its  actual  effectiveness  was  increasingly
constrained by the fiscal crisis generated at the time, and by the
fact  that  the  operative  capacity  of  the  public  sector  was16
increasingly  burdened  by the  needs  to  run  the  sector  of  newly
nationalized enterprises, banks, farms and mining.
1974-89: Fiscal Austerity,  Targeting  and Redefinition  of Social
Policies
After  the  military  coup  of  1973,  government  priorities
changed.  The goals of macroeconomic  adjustment and structural
reforms and state retrenchment took their toll on social policies.
Existing  social proarams  not only  represented  a  large  share  of
government expenditu.e but were also subject to the inertia of the
status-auo  given  by the expansion of entitlement  throughout the
previous 30 years.  As a result of changes in policy - priorities
and  macroeconomic  fluctuations,  socia'  expenditure  followed  a
rather unstable pattern during this period.
Initially, during the stabilization program of 1975, part of
the reduction in public expenditure concentrated in cutting social
spending. In fact, social expendirure fell more than GDP and total
government expenditure during the recession of 1975.  This made the
macroeconomic crisis of the mid 1970s particularly painful for low
and middle-income  groups, as social  expenditure declined  at the
same time as unemployment increased.  No wonder income distribution
worsened at that time.
In contrast, in  the recession of 1982-83 an effort was made to
maintain and extend social spending, particularly to support the
unemployed  through  subsidies,  emergency  employment  programs  and17
money transfers targeted at low-income groups  .
In  the  late  1970s,  irmportant institutional  reforms  were
initiated in  the social sectors reaching social security, education
and  the  primary  health  system.  The  basic  principles  of  these
reforms were:  (j) decentralization  in the  management  of social
programs that were transferred from the central government to local
governments  (municipalities); (ii)  a shift from social spending of
broad coverage to its targeting towards vulnerable and poor groups;
(iii) a change in the financing mechanism of social services from
direct provision to the subsidy of demand; and  (iv) promotion of
the private sector in the provision of social services" 12.
Social security was transformed from a pay-as-you-go scheme
into  a  private  capitalization  system;  public  schools  were
transferred to municipalities and funded by a standard grant per
student scheme, paving  the way  for further private provision of
education; a two-tier system was created for health and nutrition
in  which  coexisted  privately  provided  health  serv!ices  through
insurance health companies  (ISAPRES) and a public health service
10  Meller  (1991) documents  that cost of the unemployment
subsidy programs of 1982-83 represented about 1.5 percent of GDP
and benefitted some 600,000  unemployed, the program of subsidies to
debtors  in dollars,  around 2,COO people, cost near 3 percentage
points of GDP.
See Raczynski and Romaguera  (1992).
12  The  decentralization-cum-privatization  scheme  had  a
convenient political side effect for the military government in the
sense that it transferred to municipalities the dealing with near
120,000 employees, teachers, doctors and other health and education
workers. This group was very active in the past both in terms of
wage demands and capacity for political mobilization.18
for low-income groups that  cannot afford to pay  for the pri
provision of health services" 3.
Despite progress in some areas, the overall trend of social
expenditure  during  the  period  was  one  of  restraint.  Social
expenditure fell by 16 percent in 1975-76 and 12.7 percent between
1983 and  1987, and never  recovered  its 1970  level, either  as a
share of GDP or in real per capita terms (figure 2).  The fall in
social expenditure was particularly sharp in nealth, housing and
non-targeted  transfers,  especially  affecting  the  middle-class.
When these figures are contrasted with the fact that the number of
beneficiaries  of broad  social programs kept growing  during this
period,  the  effect  of  financial  restraint  look  stronger  as
illustrated in table 3 for the 1980s.
The  restraint  of  social  expenditure  impaired  other  major
developments in social policy during the military government.  On
the one hand, progress in  targeting did not necessarily improve the
situation of lower-income groups.  In 1990, the poorer 40% of the
population captured nearly two thirds of government expenditure in
health and half of the expenditure in public education  (table 4).
However, as both sectors were subject to deep budgetary cuts during
the 1980s,  most of the proceeds of lower expenditure in  middle -and
higher-income groups went to imprcve the financial stance of the
government rather than to increase direct benefits for the poor.
On the other hand, financial pressure on social programs also
13  See  Raczynski  and  Romaguera  (1992)  for  a  detailed
discussion of the reforms in that area. See also Castaneda (1990).19
threatened the success of structural reforms in social areas.  The
reduction  in  the  real  value  of  government  transfers  to
decentralized schools and health centers lefA by the end of the
1980s,  a  scarcely  sustainable  system,  rejected  by  important
segments of the population.
This situation  in  the social sectors shaped the public mood in
the  direction  of bringing  the more  socially and  redistributive
oriented parties of the center-left back to government in 1990.
1990-92: Social Debt and Social Inveament
The  Aylwin  Government  took  office  in  1990  with  two  main
commitments  in social  policy.  On the  one hand  4it  intended to
restore some benefits for low-and middle-income groups  that had
been curtailed in the last years of the authoritarian government.
On the other, it aimed at developing new social programs targeted
at high risk groups in urban areas and at improving the quality of
basic social services.  The former was labelled as servicing the
social debt and the latter, social investment.  Accomplishing these
objectives required a substantial amount of resources that would be
funded by higher taxes, by then at a historic low relative to GDP.20
Zmb2e_I: Government  Ezpenditure  in  Three  Major
social  Programs  1980-91Ca)
annual  average  ratas  of growth
Overall  Por capita  Expend. per
z penditure  MwNnd.(b)  eoneficiary(c)
1980-85  2.5  0.8  -0.5
1985-89  0.5  -1.2  -0.4
1989-91  2.8  1.2  4.2
Source: Own estimates, based on official figures.
a)  Includes primary and secondary  education, health
insurance and pensions.
b)  Overall expenditure/total  population.
c)  Overall expenditure/beneficiaries  of government
programs.
Table 4: Chile - Distribution  of Government
Social  Expenditure  in 1990
SOCIAL  EXPENDITURE
Share  of
National  Income  Monetary
Subsidies  Education  Her.lth  Housing
jower 40%  13  52  46  67  48
Middle 40%  32  38  36  27  40
Upper  20%  55  10  18  6  12
Total  100  100  100  100  100
Source:  Mujica  and Larranaga  (1992), based on the  CASEN  Survey21
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Source:  Arellano  (1985)  and  Contraloria  General  de  la  Repu'blica
and  Direccion  de  Presupuestos,  Chile.22
The broad political consensus that emerged in Chile durinSc  the
transiticn to democracy on the need to increase the social effort
facilitated an early agreement upon these issues and a tax reform
was  enacted  in a  record  time  by  mid-1990.  In  a  first  stage,
runring from mid-1990 and 1991, social debt policies get priority:
pensions and social subsidies were raised and debt-relief schemes
(e.g.  for  debt  of  low-middle  income  groups  on  housing)  were
launched.  By the end of this period, however, government policy
started moving towards "social investment".  At the end of 1991,
racome  major  programs  in basic  education,  health  infrastructure,
youth tratining  and project-funding  for the poor were already in
place, do,.bling  their share of social expenditure in the next two
years.
The  Aylwin  Government  did  not  reverse  the  institutional
changes in the social area of the 1980s.  Social security remains
as  a  private  capitalization  system  and  decentralization  of
education and health was endorsed,  In fact, it can be argued that
these institutions gained more legitimacy as further resources and
democratic control softened the herd stance of teachers, medical
staff, organized workers and the public who at different points in
time have questionr'd  the rationality of the new institutions and
their lack of resources.
The tax reform of 1990 increased fiscal revenues associated
with  rapid  growth  and the  reallocation  of government  resources
allowed,  social  expenditure  to  experience  a  growth  rate  of  1023
percent  per  annum  in  1991,  199214 without  undermining  fiscal
equilibrium.  Particularly important was the rise in funding for
health,  housing  and  social  investment  programs,  as  the  latter
replaced  social  assistance  as the  third most  important area  of
social policy after the funding of social security and basic social
services. This effort at improving equity through social policies
has been particularly  fruitful as the inertial forces  in social
expenditure  have  finally  eased  as  a  result  of  a  reversal  of
demographic trends and structural reforms that diverted the demand
of high- and middle-income groups for social services towards the
private sector.  In the case of broad-based programs depicted in
table 3, the growth of expenditure per beneficiary nearly doubled
the rate of increase in overall pubic expenditure.
Regarding absolute poverty, the data shows a decline of 10-12
percentage points  (from 45 percent to 33-35 percent) between 1988
and  1992 in the percentage  of the population  below  the poverty
line" 5 .
3. ECONOMETRIC  ANALYSIS.
In  this  section  we  explore  in a  more  systematic  way  the
determinants  of  income  distribution  in  Chile.  The  empirical
analysis is based on the Survey of Household Incomes of University
of Chile for Greater Santiago from 1960 to 1992.
Modeling the determinants of income distribution is a complcy
14  A similar increase is programmed for 1993.
is  See MIDEPLAN  (1992).24
issue  that  involves  the  interaction  between  factor  markets,
(primarily  the  labor  market),  macroeconomic  variables  and
structural factors like education and ownership of assets, all this
taking  place  in  a  h.Lstorical context  influenced  by  political
developments.  Early literature on the topic comes  back to David
Ricardo  (1817),  later  on,  a  neat  formalization  of  different
theories of distribution was provided by  Kaldor (1956).  More recent
contributions include several  strands. The effects of  macroeconomic
fluctuations and inflation on income distribution are studied in
Blinder and Esaki (1988),  Cardoso, Paes de Barros and Urani (1992),
Galor  and  Zeira  (1993). The  impact  of  structural  adjustment
policies on income distribution is developed in Bourgingon, de Melo
and  Suwa  (1991)  and  the  empirical  papers  in  that  volume.  The
interaction between growth and income  distribution (and  history) is
surveyed by Lindert and  Williamson (1985),  and reexamined in Taylor
(1992) and Person  and Tabellini  (1991). The  interaction between
politics  and  income distribution is developed, along  relatively
neo-classical  lines,  in Alesina  and  Rodrik  (1991)  and  Peroti
(1990).
The model to be estimated econometrically identifies four set
of factors that are expected to affect income  distribution in Chile
in the period  urder study:  (1) Labor market variables,  like the
unemployment  rate  and the  real  minimum wage;  (2) Macroeconomic
variables including the rate of  growth of GDP, the rate of capacity
utilization  and the inflation rate;  (3) The ability to generate
earnings, e.g. education; and (4) Some indicators of (changes in)25
the  economic  structure  due  to  structural  reforms  and  changes  in  the
political  regime  under  which  the  distributive  process  takes  place.
The  general  specification  of  the  model  can  be  written  as:
(1)  Si(t)  =  a,  +  bi  Z(t)  +  c;  MINWAGE(t)  +  di  INF(t)  +  ei  EDUC(t)
+  fi  DUMMY +  s (t)
where  Si(t)  is  the  income  share  uf the  quintil  i  (i=  1,  2...,  5)  in
total  income  in  year  t.  The  variable  Z(t)  is  G  generic  indicator  of
the  level  of  economic  activity  (as  reflected  in  the  goods  or  labor
markets)  in  year  t.  We explore  three  alternative  specifications  for
variable  Z (t):  (i)  The  aggregate  rate  of  unemployment;  (ii)  The
rate  of  capacity  utilization  ;  (iii)  Thn rate  of  growth  of  real
GDP.  Only  one  of  these  Z(t)  variables  is  included  in  each
regression  at  the  time,  to  avoid  multicollinearity  problems 16 .
The  variable  MINWAGE(t)  is  the  real  minimum  wage  in  year  t  17;
INF(t)  is  the  rate  of  change  in  the  CPI  (end  of  year)  in  period  t;
EDUC(t)  is  the  share  of  the  population  over  14  years  with  more  than
16  An  alternative  specification  would  be  to  use  a  Gini
coefficient  or  a  Theil-index  as  dependent  variables  in  the
regressions.  However,  the  specification  with  income  shares  by
quintil  allows  to  obtain  more  information  on  changes  in  the
relative  income  position  of  each  group  than  an  aggregative  index.
17  The  average  wage  index  in  Chile  comprises  wages  paid  in
national  (private  and  public)  and  foreign-owned  firms  employing
more  than  50  workers.  In  that  respect,  the  average  wage  index  is
not  a  very  good  proxy  of  the  income  of  low-income  groups  (say  1st
and  2nd  quintils)  that  are  often  employed  in  small-scale
enterprises  (less  than  50  workers),  in  the  informal  sector  (self-
employment)  and  in  traditional  agriculture,  see  Solimano  (1988a  and
b).26
primary schooling in year t. The DUMMY variable assumes the value
0  between  1960  and  1973  and  1  between  1974-92.  It  intends  to
capture changes in the economic structure of Chile associated to
the reforms implemented after 1974.  A dummy variable denoting the
political regime, e.g. democracy and authoritarianism, could not be
included in the estimation, since it would be very collinear with
the dummy post-1974 denoting change in economic structure" 8.
The model  is estimated by .LS a technique  that imposes tha
following cross-equations restrictions to the coefficients of the
model  (see Blinder and Esaki, 1988):
(2)  E1a 1= 1
(3)  Ei  bi  = Ei  ci  = Edi  =,  Ejej  = Eifi  = 0
(4)  Ei  ei  =  0  for all  t.
Given that all right-hand side variables are the same across-
equations,  estimating  each  equation  by  OLS  is  equivalent  to
estimating  the  complete  system  by  SUR  (Seemingly-Unrelated-
Regressions, see Rao and Mitra, 1971).
Table 5 presents the results of the estimation for the period
1960-91 using  the  (aggregate) rate  of unemployment  as the  Z(t)
variable (Model  I) for each of the five quintils, for the bottom 40
percent (lst and 2nd quintils) and the middle 40 percent  (3rd and
4th quintils). The estimates show that the unemployment rate has a
negative coefficient  in all quintils except  for the 5th quintil
is  Such political dummys would take values value 0 in 1960-
73 and 1990-92 (periods  of democracy) and 1 in 1974-89 (the period
of authoritarianism).27
(top 20 percent).  The coefficient is significant  at 95 percent
confidence  for the bottom 20 percent and 40 percent. This  lends
support to the hypothesis that aggregate unemployment  hits more
low-income groups and therefore has a regressive effect on income
distribution'9.
The minimum real wage (lagged one period) has a positive and
significant effect  (at 90 percent significance) on the share of
low-income groups  (first and second quintils).  It is interesting
to note that a cut in the minimum real wage redistributes income
towards the top  20 percent  (its coefficient  is negative  in the
equation of the 5th quintil).
The inflation variable fails to be significant for low-income
groups  (except in the  second  quintil)  and  has  a  significantly
negative  effect  on the  income  share of the 5th quintil  (top 20
percent) 20. This variable has an insignificant effect on the bottom
40 percent. The education variable has no positive effect on the
income share --it may have on the income levels though-- of all
quintils, except the top 20 percent. This suggests that education
levels above primary school in Chile have tended, on average, to
benefit primarily high income groups in distributive terms, though
Chile is still a country with an overall high level of education in
terms of coverage. Finally, the post-1974 dummy is insignificant
19  This  result  also  appears  in Oyarzo  (1990). His model
explains the income share by aggregate unemployment, inflation and
a time trend.
20  Oyarzo  (1990) also  obtains  a  similar  result  for  the
inflation rate.28
across all quintils groups in the specification with unemployment
rates.
The results of the regressions using a capacity utilization
variable,  (Model  II)  instead  of  the  unemployment  rate  gives
slightly better fits (higher  R 2s) for all quintils 19. The variable
of capacity utilization (ratio  of current GDP to potential GDP) has
a significantly positive effect on the income shares of the 1st,
2nd and 3rd quintils. This suggests that recessions  (a  decline in
the  rate  of  capacity  utilization),  affects  more  the  poor  and
middle-income  groups  than  the  rich  (see  tabia  6).  In  this
specification, the coefficient of the real minimum wage loses its
significance for the share of low-income groups.
Inflation is significant but positive for low-income groups.
This  result  might  challenge  conventional  wisdom,  though  five
observations are in order here:  First, the relationship between
inflation  and  income  distribution  may  depend  on  the  level  of
inflation e.g. the relationship would be non-linear.  To explore
this  possibility  we  estimated  the  model  adding  an  additional
variable, the rate of inflation above 40 percent per year.  The
coefficient of this 'high' inflation variable turned negative for
the  1st  to  the  4th  quintils  but  statistically  insignificant.
Second, there may be indirect effects of inflation on income
19  This  variable  was  constructed  using  the  estimates  of
potential GDP of Marfan  (1992).Table  5
MQofIklJnComD6tdubti0n  - Chilt, 1%0I99I
Dependent  Variables  Income  Share  Income  Share  Income  Share  Income  Share  Income  Share  Income  Share  Income  Share ____________________  lst  2nd  Bottom  40%  3rd  4th  Hiddle  40%  5th Explanatory  Variables  Quintil  Quintil  (Ist L 2nd  Quintil  Quintil  (2nd & 3rd  Quin.)  Quintil
______________________  _  __________  Qu  in.)  _
Constant  2.31  6.03  9.14  11.29  18.10  29.40  61.45
(C)  (2.73)  (6.73)  (5.10)  (9.25)  (11.50)  (11.20)  (15.80)
Unemployment  Rate,  -0.044  -0.027  -0.071  -0.022  -0.008  -0.031  0.10
(UNEMP)  (-3.12)  (-1.58)  (-2.37_  (-1.098)  (-0.33)  (-0.71)  (1.57)
Real  Minimum  Wage,  0.007  0.009  0.017  0.013'  0.027  0.040  -0.058 laqqed  (SAIXHIN-1)  (1.64)  (1.66)  (1.72)  (1.86)  (3.06)  (2.70)  (-2.61)
Inflation  Rate  -0.0002  0 001-  0.0015  0.003  0.002  0.005  -0.007
(INF)  (-0.30)  (2.33)  (1.183)  (3.42)  (2.15)  (2.88)  (-2.49)
Education  0.006  -0.01  -0.007  -0.024  -0.025  -0.049  0.057
_  (EDUC)  (0.43)  (-0.81)  (-0.26)  (-1.25)  (-1.01)  (-1.19)  (0.92)
Dummy  Post  '74  0.137  -0.22  -0.087  -0.37  -0.795  -1.17  1.25
DA__UMMY)  (0.36)  (-0.49)  (-0.108)  (-0.67)  (-1.12)  (-0.98)  (0.714i
R'  0.48  0.68  0.59  0.76  0.79  0.79  0.77 No.  of Observations  31  31  31  31  31  31  31 D.W.  1.85  2.23  2.06  2.33  2.04  2.15  2.16
t  - statistic  under  parenthesis
*  - siqnificant  at 90%
**  - significant  at 95%30
distribution.  In a full structural model, inflation and the rate
of capacity utilization are related through aggregate supply and
aggregate demand.  In our sample, the coefficient of correlation
between the two variables for the whole sample period  (1960-91) is
-0.62  (this negative  correlation  may  reflect  the  dominance  of
supply  shocks in the period).  In this case, we should expect  a
negative indirect effect of inflation on the shares of low-income
groups through the capacity utilization variable.  Third,  from a
public finance view, the inflation tax is a source of revenues for
the government,  that could have financed subridies to low-income
families.  In  that  case  there  would  be  a  positive  relationship
between inflation and the share of the low quintils.  Fourth, the
period under consideration includes the Allende years  in which a
redistribution of income towards low-income groups coincided with
an acceleration  of inflation and the Pinochet  years  in which  a
deterioration  in income distribution coincided with a  period of
disinflation.  Thus,  income shares  of the  1st and  2nd quintils
coincidentally moved in the same direction as the inflation rate.
Fifth, both the 1st and 5th quintils correspond to groups whose
income  tend  to  be positively  tied  to  the  price  level  as  they
generate their income from self-employment in the informal sector
or from profits and high-salaries groups.Table  6
Depandent  Variables  Income  Share  Income  Share  Income  Share  Income  Share  Income Share  Income  Share  Income  Share
___________________  I1st  2nd  Bottom  40%  3rd  4th  Middle  40%  5th
Explanatory  Variables  Quintil  Quintil  (lst & 2nd Quin.)  Quintil  Quintil  (2nd L  3rd Quin.)  Quintil
Constant  -2.34  3.54  1.19  8.30  16.50  24.8G  74.00
_(C)  (-1.701  (2.08)  (0.40)  (3.99)  (6.02)  (5.48)  (11.34)
Capacity  Utilization  5.71  4.07'  9.77  3.71  2.02  5.74  -15.51"
(UTIL)  (3.90)  (2.24)  (3.12)  (1.68)  (0.69)  (1.19)  (-2.23)
Real  Minimum  Wage,  0.002  0.006  0.008  0.010  0.026  0.036  -0.045"
laqqed  (SALMIN-1)  (0.57)  (1.14)  (0.92)  (1.52)  (3.01)  (2.52)  (-2.16)
Inflation  Rate  0.001  0.003"  0.  004  0.04"  0.003-  0.007  -O.011
(INF)  (2.06)  (3.25)  (2.03)  (3.76)  (2.11)  (3.01)  (-3.37)
Education  -0.009  -0.025  -0.035  -0.036  -0.032  -0.068  0.104
(EDUC)  (-0.71)  (-1.48)  (-1.186)  (-1.72)  (-1.18)  (-1.50)  (1.58)
Dummy  Post  '74  0.27  -0.048  0.22  -0.173  -0.62  -0.79  0.57
(DUMMY)  (0.76)  (-0.11)  (0.29)  (-0.32)  (-0.88)  (-0.68)  (0.34)
RI  0.54  0.71  0.64  0.77  0.79  0.80  0.79
No.  of Observations  31  31  31  31  31  31  31
D.W.  2.01  2.38  2.23  2.37  _  2.04  2.15  2.23
t  - statistic  under  parenthesis
*  - significant  at  90%
**  - significant  at  95%32
The  third  specification  (model III)  inclules  t.he  rate  of
growth of real GDP as an explanatory variable. This variable has a
positive and significant coefficient for the bottom 1st quintil and
the bottom 40 percent, a smaller but still positive coefficient for
the  3rd and 4th quintil  and a  negative coefficient  for the  5th
quintil. This is an interesting result suggesting that GDP growth,
on average, was equalizing in Chile, e.g. it narrowed down income
differentials by benefiting relatively more to low-income groups.
Given, that the rate of GDP growth is (negatively) correlated with
the rate of unemployment and (positively)  associated with the rate
of capacity utilization --variables that have a greater impact on
the  low quintils --  this result  is in line with the findings of
Model  I  and  Model  II.  The  dummy  variable  that  appeared  as
insignificant in  the previous specifications with unemployment and
capacity  utilization  becomes  negative  and  significant  for  all
quintils, except the 5th quintil. This suggests that after 1974 a
shift  occurred  in  the  Chilean  economy  that  tilted  income
distribution in favor of the top 20 percent of the population, and
therefore offsetting  the  'equalizing' effect  of growth which  on
average, was not very high either. In the other  specifications,
that regressive shift was captured, to a large extent, through the
increase in the average unemployment rate after 1974 or the lower
average rates of capacity utilization observed in  that period. That
shift, however, is not captured by the rate of GDP growth.Table  7
Madc-UAILtegressiou Iome  Pistritt«iQn  i- Chile. l96-JL91
Dependent  Variable  Income  Share  Income  Share  Income  Share  Income  Share  Income  Share  Income  Share  Income  Share ----_---_-----------_  1st  2nd  Bottom  40%  3rd  4th  Middle  40%  5th Explanatory  Variable  Quintil  Quintil  (Ist  &  2nd  Quin.)  Quintil  Quintil  (2nd  A  3rd  Quin.)  Quintil
Constant  1.766  6.511  8.278  11.05  18.03  29.08  62.63 (C)  (1.92)  (6.21)  (4.37)  (8.84)  (11.34)  (10.91)  (15.56)
GDP  Growth  0.036  0.020  0.056  0.015  0.003  0.018  -0.074 (GROWTH)  (2.21)  (1.11)  (1.69)  (0.68)  (0.11)  (0.38)  (-1.05)
Real  Minimum  Wage,  0.0053  0.008  0.013  0.011  0.027  0.038  -0.052 lagqed  (SALMIN-1)  (1.05)  (1.39)  (1.28)  (1.68)  (3.06)  (2.61)  (-2.33)
Inflation  Rate  0.0004  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.002  0.005  -0.008 (INF)  (0.63)  (2.47)  (1.67)  (3.26)  (1.95)  (2.69)  (-2.57)
Education  0.015  -0.007  0.008  -0.019  -0.023  -0.043  0.035 (EDUC)  (1.08)  (-0.454)  (0.275)  (-1.014)  (-0.96  1.04)  (0.56)
Dummy  Post  '74  -0.587  -0.668'  -1.25'  -0.74  -0.94  -1.69  2.947 (DUMMY)  (-1.90)  (-1.899)  (-1.97)  (-1.78)  (-1.76)  (-1.88)  (2.18)
R]  0.39  0.67  0.55  0.75  0.70  0.79  0.76 No.  of Observations  31  31  31  31  31  31  31 D.W.  1.64  2.12  1.88  2.32  2.05  2.17  2.13
t  - statistic  under  parenthesis
*  - significant  at  90%
ha  - significant  at 951
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Finally,  table  8  reports  the  estimates  of  model  I
(specification with the rate of unemployment) for the period 1974-
91  including  the  ratio  of  social  expenditure  over  GDP
(unfortunately  a  comparable  series  for  that  variable  Is  not
available,  continuously,  for  the  period  1960-1973).  It  is
interesting to note that the social expenditure to GDP ratio has a
positive and significant impact  on all quintils, except for the 5th
quintil. This suggests that social expenditure benefitted both tha
relative  income  position  of the middle-class  and the  bottom  40
percent in the period 1974-91 vis A  vis the top 20 percent 20.
In addition, the coefficients of the unemployment variable and
the real minimum wage are higher, in absolute value, in this sample
than in the sample for the whole period.
Explaining Changes in Income Shares.
An interesting exercise is to use the estimates of the models
to explain actual changes in income  shares in Chile during some key
sub-periods. Table 9, shows the actual changes in income shares of
both the bottom 40 percent and the top 20 percent in the period
1974-89  vis  a  v4.s  1960-73  and 1990-92  vis a  vis the period 1974-89
as explained by changes in the explanatory variables  of model I
(unemployment specification) and model III (growth  specification).
The decline in 1.4 percentage points of the bottom 40 percent in
the period 1974-89  with respect to the period 1960-73  is explained
in Model I, mainly by the average increase in the rate of
20  It is  worth considering that social expenditure includes
public spending in health, housing, subsidies to low-income groups
besides education.Table  8
Model IV:  Regessions  Income  Distribution - Chile.  1974-1991
Income  Share  Income  Share  Income  Share  Income  Share  Income  Share  Income Share  Income  Share Explanatory  Variable  1st  2nd  Bottom  40%  3rd  4th  Middle  40%  - 5th
Quintil  Quintil  (lst  L  2nd  Quin.)  Quintil  Quintil  (2nd  & 3rd  Quin.)  Quintil
Constant  -3.560  -3.540  -7.10  -3.150  -1.410  -4.570  111.67 (C)  (-1.82)  (-0.89)  (-1.23)  (-0.48)  (-0.16)  (-0.31)  (5.70)
Unemployment  Rate  -O.101  -0.113  -0.214  -0.137  -0.173  -0.311  0.525
(UNEMP)  (-6.02)  (-3.28)  (-4.32)  (-2.46)  (-2.37)  (-2.48)  (3.11)
Real  Minimum  Wage,  0.023"  0.037"  0.060"  0.050  0.077-  0.127-  -0.188 lagged  (SALMIN-1)  (3.97)  (3.19)  (3.56)  (2.62)  (3.11)  (2.98)  (-3.26)
Intlation  Rate  0.0017  0.007  0.008  0.011  0.014  0.026  -0.034 (INF)  (1.34)  (2.55)  (2.22)  (2.649)  (2.59)  (2.69)  _-2.65)
Education  0.142"  0.055  0.098  0.071  0.094  0.165  -0.263 (EDUC)  (2.61)  (1.69)  (2.06)  (1.32)  (1.33)  (1.37)  (-1.62)
Social  Expenditure,  0.766"  1.086"  1.852"  1.504  2.112  3.617  -5.469" lagged  (SOCIAL-I)  (3.71)  (2.59)  (3.055)  (2.20)  (2.36)  (2.36)  (-2.65)
R'  0.88  0.58  0.69  0.57  0.63  0.62  0.595 No.  of Observations  17  17  17  17  17  17  17 O.W.  2.35  2.38  2.35  2.59  2.80  2.72  2.59
t  - statistic  under  parenthesis
- significant  at 90%
**  - significant  at  95% 
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unemployment -0.83 percentage points and by the decline in the real
minimum wage, -0.44 percentage points.  The contribution of  changes
in inflation and education over the relevant  sub-periods are of
second-order importance.  In contrast, the change  in rate of GDP
growth  (which  was of small magnitude between 1974-89 and 1960-73,
see table  1) has a  small  explanatory  power  to  account  for  the
decline in the share of the bottom 40 percent in the period 1974-
89. The dummy  variable accounts for most  of the decline  in the
share of the bottom 40 parcent between the two sub-periods.
The increase of 4.7 percentage points in the share of the top
20  percent 4n the period 1974-89 is explained at around 60 percent
(2.72)  by the increase in unemployment and the decline in the reaL
minimum  wage that  squeezed the relative  share  of  the bottom  40
percenit (and also  part  of  the  income  share  of  the  middle  40
percent). The beneficiary of that redistributive shift was the top
20 percent. Once again, the explanatory power of the model with the
rate of growth of GDP was rather low, to account for the shift in
income distribution towards the top 20 percent 21.
Finally, the improvement in the income share of the bottom 40
percent by  1 percentage point  during  1990-92 is explained to a
large extent  by the  improvement  in labor market  performance  as
reflected by the decline in unemployment and increase in minimum
wages in this period.
21  Other factors that probably explain the regressive shift
in income distribution during the years of Pinochet is the decline
in public  sector wages  in real terms that affected, mainly, the
middle  class  and  the  assets  redistributions  associated  to  the
privatization  and  the  rescue  operations  of  main  financial
intermediaries after the crisis of 1982-83 (see Mellar, 1991).37
4. CONCLUSIONS.
After  a  relatively  stable  pattern  of  income  distribution
throughout the 1960s and a redistribution towards low -. ncome groups
during the Allende Government, income  distribution worsened for the
bottom and middle 40 percent during the Finochet Regime. The top 20
percent income group of the population was the great beneficiary of
these  redistributive  shifts  against  low-income  groups  and  the
middle  class.  The  Aylwin  Administration  reverted  most  of  the
deterioration of the income share of the bottom 40 percent, though
still the top 20 percent capture a greater percentage of national
income than its historical average of before 1973.
Our empirical analysis shows that the deterioratioi,  of income
distribution  for the poor  in Chile  in the  initial sears of the
market-oriented reform process is, to a large extent, due to the
weak  performance  of the labor market after  1974, reflecting  in
high and persistent unemployment and a squeeze on the real minimum
wage and other wages categories. Inflation and education have low
explanatory  power  to account for the post-1974  deterioration in
income distribution for low-income groups.
The middle-class (3rd  and 4th quintils) decliL.ed  its share of
national  income by near  3 percentage points, on average, during
1974-89. The  reform  of the public  sector,  through reduction  of
employment and a prolonged decline in public sector wages, seems to
account for an important part of the decline in the share of this
group.  A post-1974  dummy  is important  in "etxplaining" the  increaseTable 9
Explaining  Changes  in  Income
shares of  Bottom  40 Percent
and  Top 20  Percent
BOTTOM 40%  TOP 20%
1974-1989  1990-1992  1974-1989  1990-1992
w/r  w/r  w/r  wit
1960-1973  1974-1989  1960-1973  1974-1969
Actual Change in
Income Share
(Percentage Points)  -1.4  -1.4  1.0  1.0  4.7  4.7  -0.  5  -0.5
Sxplained by
(Percentage Points)  2of2l_  I4iiLi_AH  H2del I  Model III  dolI0II  0431U  model I  Waal  III Change in:
Unemployment Rate  -0.83  0.75  1.20  -1.06
GDP Growth  -0.006  0.14  0.007  -0.18
Real Minimum Wage  -0.44  -0.341  -0.024  -0.019  1.52  1.36  0.08  0.07
Inflation  -0.003  -0.003  -0.09  -0.12  0.01  0.014  0.42  0.48
Education  -0.113  0.129  -0.113  0.10  0.92  0.56  0.72  0.44
Dummy  -0.087  -1.25  -0.087  -1.25  -1.25  2.95  1.25  2.95
Restdual  L  -0.07  -0.07  0.56  2.1  -0.2  -0.19  1.91  4.339
in the share of the top 20 percent suggesting a sort of permanent
regressive shift in income  distribution against the middle-class in
Chile.
The  empirical  analysis  shows  that  recessions  with  high
unemployment  are  socially  regressive,  concentrating  a
disproportionate burden of the adjustment on the poor, who lower
their share of income 22. Growth, on the other hand, is rather weak
as an equalizing force 23 unless accompanied by a major impact upon
labor markets. This might explain why trickle down was so sluggish
during  1976-81.  Only  when  the  Chileaa  economy  approached  full
capacity,  real  wages  increased  and  unemployment  dropped  to  a
historical low in the early 1990s, income distribution started to
improve.
The  latter  justifies  some  moderate  optimism  about  the
prospects of income  distribution in Chile in the next few years. If
the economy keeps growing and investment grows even faster --as in
the last two years-- the labor market will remain tighter than in
any period  in the last 30 years and distributive conditions may
well improve.
Further progress in the welfare of lower-income groups can be
sought through social policies. Social  programs demand a high share
of government  resources  in Chile,  and these  are  directed  in a
fairly large proportion towards the poorer 40% of the population.
22  A  drop  in  the  rate  of  capacity  utilization  reduce
relatively more the income share of low-income groups.
23  GDP growth appears as "equalizing", say its coefficient
is greater for the lower quintils)40
The scope for improving the quality of social services is higher
today  than  in the  past,  as  most  of the  pressures  upon  social
expenditure coming from entitlement and demographic pressures have
eased during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Further  targeting,  on  the  other  hand,  should  be  studied
cautiously,  to  avoid  the  risk  of  a  "poverty  trap"  in  which
incentives are weaken  for "self-empowerment" to operate and pull
the poor out of poverty by its own means after a critical threshold
of basic needs are met. Also social policies should not alienate
middle  income  groups  already  affected  by  adverse  distributive
trends in the past.
The analysis indicates that the effect of inflation and income
distribution is  a  complex one, subject  to potential non-linearities
and several effects of opposite sign.
We  posed  at the  beginning  the question  to  which  extent  a
liberal policy regime  (e.g. a liberalized economy) is compatible
with  social  equity.  The  experience  of  Chile  in  this  matter
indicates that income  distribution deteriorated, on  average, during
the program of reforms. An important part of the story is due to
macroeconomic  crises  and  its  sequels  of  high  unemployment  and
depressed real wages. In fact, it is  not clear that more structural
reforms  like trade  liberalization and deregulation  are  socially
regressive.  However, our conclusion from the Chilean experience
is that market outcomes --that dominate in a liberalized economy --
may  generate  regressive  results  through  for  example  high  and
persistent  unemployment  (e.g. a  market  failure).  In this  case,41
there is an important role for social policy to correct regressive
shifts  in  income  distribution  outcomes  from  market  processes.
Finally, a sort of Kuznets relationship between economic reform and
income  distribution  could  be  assumed.  In  this  case,  income
distribution would tend to worsen in the initial phase of a process
of reform when real wages fall and unemployment increases to then
improve latter on as medium-term growth takes-off and labor market
conditions  improve.  Of  course, more  empirical analysis  of the
evolution of income distribution in other reforming economies is
needed to explore more fully this relationship.42
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The series  used in this paper come from the University  of Chile
Employment  and Income  Surveys  for Greater  Santiago.  These surveys
have been carried continuously  on a quarterly  basis since 1956,
including  an earnings  block  in the  June  survey.  The  collected  data
has been classified  per quintiles  of income  earners (instead  of
households).
The  University  of Chile  data  on income  distribution  was subject  to
some  controversy  in the early  1980s,  after  the publication  of the
study  of I.Heskia  (1979),  which  produced  the  first  annual  series  of
income  distribution  over  a  relatively  long  period  (up  to 1978).  The
basic criticism  was that actual incomes were underestimated  in
these  surveys,  but  also  that  the  degree  of  underestimation  changed
over income groups and time4. This criticism  is valid though it is
also  applicable  to other  income  surveys.
Table A-1 compares the  series used in this paper with income
distribution  data from  three  alternative  sources  for the years  in
which information  for the latter  is available.  These alternative
sources  are: (i)  household  budget  surveys  for  Santiago,  carried  out
by the National Institute  of Statistics (INE); (ii) the CASEN
national  survey,  commissioned  by  MIDEPLAN,  and (iii)  INE's  National
Employment  Survey,  which once a year collects  earnings  data at a
national level very much like the University  of Chile does in
santiago. From this table it appears that although there are
differences in the  levels of  income shares for the  different
groups'5  in some  years,  the changes  in the  available  subperiods  are
broadly  consistent  between  the different  sources (see  table  A-1).
UnemRloyment
Unemployment rates are obtained from the University of  Chile
quarterly  surveys for Greater Santiago.  The basic data has been
adjusted to  include workers enrolled in emergency employment
programs  as unemployed.  This procedure  was customarily  used in
24  See Cortazar (1982),  Riveros  LY.1 Labbe (1985)  and ECLA
(1987).
25  This difference  may well arise from the fact that the
alternative  series  are  based  on incomes  data for  households  rather
than income  earners  and poorer  households  tend to be larger  than
richer  ones.TABLE  A-1
CHILE:  ALTERNATIVE  ESTINATES  OF INCOME
DISTRIOUWIOU  1969-91
U  OF  IRE  CASEN
CHILE  -----  ---  - National
(a)  EPF  ENE  (d)
C Stgo  National
(b)  (c)
Poorer  40X
1969  11.7  19.4
1978  9.7  14.5  14.1
1987  7.5  12.3
1988  8.9  12.6  11.8
1989  9.5  12.6
1990  9.0  13.3  13.6
1991  9.6  14.7
Intermediate  40X
1969  31.3  36.2
1978  29.5  34.6  34.0
1987  24.0  31.2
1988  26.4  32.8  27.8
1989  27.7  27.9
1990  26.7  28.7  32.1
1991  28.2  3r.6
Richer  20G
1969  57.U  44.4
1978  60.8  50.9  51.9
1987  68.5  56.5
1988  64.7  54.6  60.4
1939  62.8  59.5
1990  64.3  58.0  54.3
1991  62.2  54.7
a) University  of Chile,  Employment  Survey  for
Greater  Sentlago.
b) Households  Budget  Survey,  IKE.  Distribution
of  spending.
c)  National  Eployment Survey,  INE.
d)  CASEN  Survey,  NIDEPLAN48
the 1980s in Chile to keep a closer track of the actual conditions
of the labor market. Such an adjustment  is also relevant for our
analysis in this paper as these workers were paid a subsidy which
used to be only a fraction of the national minimum wage.
Capacity Utilization
Capacity utilization ratios are taken from Marfan  (1992), updated
for  1992.  These  ratios  are  calculated  u-ni  National  Account
figures, which also provide the figures for GuP growth.
Intlation and Real Wages
Inflation rates are calculated as the annual rates of change in the
Consumer  Price  Index,  published  by  INE.  This  index  has  been
reestimated for the high inflation periods of 1970-73 and 1970-78
by Yafiez  (1984)  and Cortazar and Marshall (1980)  with substantially
differer.c  results. For 1970-78, therefore, annual inflation rates
have been taken form these latter sources.
The adjusted CPI is also applied to deflate the annual change in
money wages. The latter is obtained from the National Wages Index,
published by INE.
Education
An  indicator  for  education  is  also  included  in  the  equations
estimated  above.  This  is given  by the share  of population  with
complete  basic  education  or  more  on  total  adult  population,
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